Charlie Magri and Dr. Ted R. Bromund have published a new article on EJIL:Talk!, the blog of the European Journal of International Law, titled “The Channel INTERPOL Has Chosen Not to Watch.” It looks at the rules adopted in 2024 and 2025 that restrict oversight of INTERPOL direct messages, the exchanges National Central Bureaus (NCBs) send each other through INTERPOL’s secure network.
The largest channel INTERPOL operates
Notices and diffusions draw most of the attention, yet INTERPOL puts the number of messages exchanged on its network in the tens of millions a year, against 27,525 notices and 30,015 diffusions in 2025. A single message can ask police abroad to locate or arrest a named person, and the person named will ordinarily never learn it exists.
Under Article 22(6) of the Rules on the Processing of Data, adopted in Glasgow in 2024, the General Secretariat may access a message it was not copied in on only with explicit authorization or when it becomes aware of a potential violation. Article 19(2) of the CCF Statute, amended in Marrakech in 2025 (see our earlier IELR article), applies the same conditions to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF). Since it is hard to become aware of a violation in a message nobody outside the exchange can see, review comes to depend largely on reports from the bureaus whose conduct it is meant to check.
Why it matters
The article takes the case of a dissident living abroad whose Red Notice has been refused, or deleted by the CCF, because the case is political.
“No INTERPOL check now prevents the same government that sought a Red Notice from turning to INTERPOL’s messaging system the next day to ask its counterparts abroad to locate or arrest that person on the same facts.”
Charlie Magri and Ted R. Bromund, EJIL:Talk!, 19 November 2026
INTERPOL’s published guidance says that once a notice or diffusion is denied under Article 2(1) or 3 of its Constitution, “no further cooperation is allowed to take place via INTERPOL”. Unless the General Secretariat is copied in, however, neither it nor the CCF would see such a message. The rules also limit INTERPOL data access requests: a person asking the CCF what INTERPOL holds about them will, by default, receive an answer that leaves direct messages out.
Two fixes and the question of immunity
The article proposes two narrow fixes that keep confidentiality as the default. The first is a warning to the sending bureau, with a record kept, when a message names a person whose notice or diffusion was refused or deleted on Article 2 or 3 grounds. The second would write INTERPOL’s existing guidance into the rules. The article ends with INTERPOL’s immunity, including the new General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, which Charlie Magri, Ted R. Bromund and Sandra Grossman argued against in Just Security, and the claim pending before the Lyon judicial court.
“If individuals cannot challenge information circulated about them through INTERPOL’s direct messaging system, it becomes harder to regard the CCF as providing an effective alternative remedy.”
Charlie Magri and Ted R. Bromund, EJIL:Talk!, 19 November 2026
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